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The concept of Aufhebung in the thought of Merold Westphal:
appropriation and recontextualization
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Merold Westphal’s method often consists in recontextualizing, or appropriating, var-
ious sources in order to either make his own argument or to make other’s arguments
seem self-evident. This method is especially noteworthy in his use of Aufhebung, a
term which he initially discovers in his early work on Hegel. Westphal will eventually
appropriate this term and, as this article will show, utilize it throughout his other
academic works, particularly in his reading of Kierkegaard, for many an ‘anti-dialec-
tical’ thinker. This article further explores Westphal’s use of the term in order to reveal
that his utilization of the term extends beyond Hegel’s own original intention and that,
in doing so, Westphal creates something quite unique and separate from the term itself:
a ‘Westphalian Aufhebung.’
Keywords: Merold Westphal; Søren Kierkegaard; G.W.F. Hegel; recontextualization;
postmodern philosophy; philosophy of religion
Merold Westphal is well respected in the field of Hegel scholarship, yet is not a Hegelian.
His work on Kierkegaard is equally respected, and while one can rightly call him a
Kierkegaardian, it would be at the cost of delimiting his expansive work to one – albeit
important – aspect of his thought. Likewise, Westphal is wrongly considered a postmo-
dernist, even though he grapples with postmodern thought and contemporary philosophy
of religion. For Westphal, we are still as much modern as we are postmodern.1 So what
are we to make of Westphal and how he enters into these debates? Moreover, in the
context of understanding his work as a whole, how does Westphal utilize these debates to
progress his own point of view?
William Desmond offers us insight into these questions where he describes Westphal’s
thought as a gentle despoilment of the Egyptians. His fidelity to his sources superficially
appears to be an acceptance of their thought only to actually become, not just a critique,
but a piecemeal acquisition of certain aspects of said source’s thought.2 It is not a hostile
takeover – it is not a takeover at all – rather, it is a form of retrieval: he takes parts of an
author’s idea while diligently critiquing the idea as a whole. A charitable reading of this
would call it a recontextualization, but perhaps calling it a ‘gentle despoilment’ is more
honest.3
Nowhere is this more evident in Westphal’s thought than it is with his reading of
Hegel and his use of Aufhebung. As Desmond notes, Westphal will take this contentious
term and, in a gentle despoilment, he will make it do all sorts of ‘productive, indeed
benign, work for him.’4 Westphal’s most productive use of Aufhebung comes from his
reading of Kierkegaard, particularly when describing Kierkegaard’s concept of the
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teleological suspension. On several occasions and in varying contexts, Westphal will
equate the two terms as meaning the same thing, which not only shows how greatly
Hegel has influenced Westphal’s thought but it also reveals that what Westphal has taken
is not just Hegel’s terminology, but the structure and foundation of Hegel’s thought as
well.5 Westphal’s despoilment of Hegel is, in other words, not a robbery but a particular
type of recontextualization – perhaps a reconstitution – of Hegelian concepts into a
different project altogether.
In what follows, we will explore whether or not Westphal’s use of Aufhebung is
indeed such an instance of this type of recontextualization. This is important for under-
standing Westphal’s philosophy of religion for three reasons: First, it will show how much
Hegel has influenced Westphal’s thought in general, which makes a further exploration of
Westphal’s critique of Hegel all the more necessary. Second, it will problematize
Westphal’s fidelity to the text itself by revealing the (hermeneutical) gap between the
text in question and Westphal’s reception of the text. While this is true of all readers of
texts, it is important nonetheless for understanding Westphal since much of his own
thought revolves around placing other authors into dialogue, and thus placing a priority
on the text’s authority itself. This is particularly true with his use of Scripture. Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, this will give us an insight into the way in which this type of
recontextualization works within all of Westphal’s thought. By looking at one key
example, we can thereby better understand how Westphal’s dialogue between texts and
authors builds toward a central idea, while also negating aspects of his dialogue partners’
thinking. In short, his dialogues often function as ‘Westphalian Aufhebung.’6
We will therefore set out to prove this thesis by first exploring the complicated nature
and use of Aufhebung in Hegel’s own work. Once we have a grasp on what is admittedly a
tricky word, let alone concept, then we will explore and compare Westphal’s own use of
the term. We will see the differences in usage by first exploring how Westphal uses the
term in his Hegelian writings – proving that he has a solid grasp of how Hegel used the
term himself – and how he uses it with Kierkegaard – proving that Westphal’s own use of
the term does something similar yet different from Hegel’s use of the term. We will then
conclude by analyzing how Westphal’s use of the Hegelian Aufhebung reveals the way in
which Westphal goes about recontextualizing his sources, lifting them up – or despoiling
them, if you prefer – into his own thought.
Hegel’s use of Aufhebung
Aufhebung is a common German word which in and of itself is not a philosophical term,
yet its meaning quickly lends itself into becoming one. Aufhebung, in its common usage,
means to cancel out something while also simultaneously picking it up, and yet this overly
simple definition does not completely contain its everyday use in German nor is its usage
by Hegel. Therefore, we must begin by unpacking the term itself. As Ralph Palm notes, its
trickiness in Hegel’s works confounds several scholars, particularly translators of Hegel
into English, who do not know whether to translate it into suspension, sublation, or simply
to leave it in the German form.7 While suspension does not quite do justice to the negation
involved in Aufhebung, sublation’s usage in English is all but obsolete, thus rendering it
little to no help in explaining the word’s meaning. Likewise, keeping it in its German form
can appear to be ducking the question regarding its meaning while also causing headaches
between the German–English grammatical crossover. For example, you thus have to
choose whether to use Aufhebung – meaning ‘sublation’ – or aufheben – meaning ‘to
sublate’ – or even aufgehoben – meaning ‘sublated.’8
2 J. Sands
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Moving toward Hegel’s own conception of the term, we notice that he explains it only
in four sections, the most important being in Science of Logic, within the first chapter of
Book One, entitled ‘The Doctrine of Being.’9 Here in an additional remark (Zusatz),
Hegel refers to its everyday German usage in which there is a preservation – the picking
up can be seen as a form of preserving – while also a cessation, but what matters most to
him is the simultaneity of this action; it is not an ‘if-then’ movement but a double action.
‘That which is sublated,’ remarks Hegel, ‘is thus something at the same time preserved,
something that has lost its immediacy but has not come to nothing.’10 As Walter
Kaufmann notes, this is akin to picking up a fallen book off of the floor and putting it
on a shelf: you have removed the book from its present state – the negative or cancelling
action – while also having preserved its condition – the positive or preservative action.11
However, this explanation only goes so far, given that after Hegel notes the double action
within Aufhebung he goes on to add a third element to the term: that it not only cancels
yet preserves, but it also elevates the object in question. He does this through contrasting
Aufhebung with the related, but etymologically distinct, Latin term, tollere.12 Tollere here
means to take or lift up, as in the book upon the shelf, but aufheben, through its negating
act, goes one step further and implies an elevation of the book’s concept, its ‘bookness,’
into something else altogether. More exactly, Hegel characterizes tollere as merely an
affirmative action, whereas aufheben involves the unity of affirmation and negation.
Something is taken away in the act, which makes aufheben a much more impactful
concept given that the object in question (within the Aufhebung) is no longer the same.
While Aufhebung is directly related to the dialectic – Palm goes so far as to call it ‘the
heart of the dialectic’ – it should be understood also as its own distinct, speculative (i.e.
infinite) term.13 This is perhaps best seen through Hegel’s concept of becoming found
within being and nothingness, the topic which Hegel himself is addressing in Science of
Logic and in which he brings up the reflection upon Aufhebung in the first place.
Therefore, let us pivot our examination of Aufhebung toward his concept of becoming
in order to better grasp the meaning of this term. However, it is important to note that
since our interest is not in Hegel’s concept of becoming, our treatment of this concept will
be all too brief and simplistic and will focus primarily on Aufhebung and not the larger
implications of Hegel’s thought.
For Hegel, being (Sein) begins with a concept of ‘pure being’ (reine Sein), which is
distinct from any concept of determinate being, where existence takes shape and forms
into a thing unto itself.14 In other words, before there is ‘a being’ (determinate being),
there must be a general concept of ‘pure being,’ indeterminate and unconstructed, from
which ‘a being’ emerges. Pure being, according to Hegel, cannot have ‘any determination
with respect to another, so too it cannot have any within;’ it is devoid of content and thus
has no mediated distinction with/against an other.15 Any distinction or determination
would thus render it into something else, ‘a being,’ which would exist with other beings
(from which it is distinct and determined).
Interestingly, this sounds much like nothingness except for one great difference: the
intuitive meaning behind the concept of nothingness. To be exact, Hegel calls this ‘pure
nothingness,’ which he goes on to describe as ‘complete emptiness, complete absence of
determination and content; lack of all distinction within.’16 So far, pure being and pure
nothingness sound like the same thing; however, to think of nothing intuits a meaning –
even if it is the absence of meaning. ‘So,’ Hegel concludes, ‘nothing is [i.e. it concretely
exists] in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is the empty intuiting and thinking itself,
like being.’17 Paradoxically, this renders pure being and pure nothing as the same – both
are indeterminate and empty – but yet they are different in respects to their intuitive
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 3
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meaning and therefore they are not the same.18 Pure being intuits an existence – however
indeterminate – while pure nothingness intuits an absence of existence.
This paradox exists because of the unity within pure being and nothing. This unity,
however, dissolves in an instant when pure being ‘passes over’ pure nothingness in its
becoming determinate being.19 As far as becoming is concerned, the ‘purity’ of being is
thus negated through this passing over into determinate being. Hegel plainly sees that his
notion of being and nothingness coming together to create ‘a being’ is paradoxical and
astonishing to most – mainly because some may fail to see the relationship between
indeterminacy and determinacy. So, to clarify, he remarks how this paradox correlates to
various creation motifs and concepts of existence within Christianity, which uses similar
ex nihilo concepts, and Buddhism, which emphasizes a similar notion of indeterminate
nothingness.20 Let us turn now to how paradoxes function as a transitional aspect of his
logic and its relationship to Aufhebung.
As Palm notes, the key to understanding the paradox of pure being and pure nothing
becoming a determinate being is noticing the location of the paradox within the transition
(or becoming) itself.21 In becoming, two things happen: (1) pure, indeterminate being and
nothing are distinct and opposing yet also the same, and, as such, they (2) immediately
proceed to cancel out the contradiction of the paradox (their ‘opposite-yet-the-sameness’)
while preserving and forming a determinate being. As Hegel states:
But the truth is . . . that they are the not the same, that they are absolutely distinct yet equally
unseparated and inseparable, and that each immediately vanishes into its opposite. Their truth
is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a
movement in which the two are distinguished but by a distinction which has just immediately
dissolved itself.22
Pure being and pure nothing’s co-existence immediately causes a reaction which becomes
something new, a distinct determinate being. This unity is better understood through its
double sense: at the level of sameness they are an abstract unity (abstrakte Einhheit) and
at the moment of union, in their becoming, they are a determinate union (bestimmte
Einheit). Therefore, in their becoming, or unifying, being and nothing’s indeterminacy is
removed – their ‘pureness’ is taken away or ceased – as being passes over nothing into
becoming something: a determinate, distinct, and individual being. This, for Hegel, is a
moment of sublation (or Aufhebung): ‘In this unity, therefore, they are, but as vanishing,
only as sublated. They sink from their initially represented self-subsistence into moments
which are still distinguished but at the same time sublated.’23
Aufhebung, therefore, is what makes this process of becoming a determinate being
possible or, more exactly, it is the key to explaining what happens in becoming a
determinate being. The ‘in’ here is operative because it is important to note that the
Aufhebung is not an external happening but that it happens within the unity of being and
nothing; there are no outside influences or forces causing the negation. Pure being and
pure nothing, Palm remarks, ‘sublate themselves’ through an ‘internal determination from
within a given moment operating on itself.’24 This is absolutely key to understanding
Aufhebung because we must recognize that no outside factor can cause the negating act,
but only the two concepts (either concretely or abstractly) coming in union within
themselves. No outside factor can cause this sublation, nor can another factor play catalyst
to their unionizing: they come together, negate and preserve, and elevate by their own
attraction. This may not be applicable to pure, indeterminate being and nothingness,
which are abstract concepts that Hegel uses to convey a particular thought, but, for our
4 J. Sands
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purposes of understanding Aufhebung, is it key to remember that Hegel sees this move-
ment as contained within the process itself.
In regards to the dialectic, this process of becoming can be reasonably deduced from
determinate being to indeterminate being and non-being. The dialectic, in this manner,
presupposes a negation within this becoming, where the process inherently posits a
negation of another concept, in this case indeterminate being’s negation of indeterminate
non-being.25 As David Gray Carlson notes, ‘according to Dialectical Reason, Becoming
has a second aspect. It is ceasing-to-be (Verstehen), which starts from Being and ends at
Nothing. It concedes the Understanding’s point that Nothing turns into Being. But it
embarrasses the Understanding by pointing out that the opposite is just as true: Being
turns into Nothing. It has “ceased to be.”’26 ‘Embarrassed,’ here, is how dialectical
reasoning challenges the Understanding by revealing what it has negated and, conse-
quently, that this negation could have been an opposite movement from being to nothing.
Dialectical reasoning reveals the negative aspect of these movements within the
Aufhebung, which allows one to deduce what has been negated. Just as speculative
reasoning allows one to explore the act of ‘becoming’ in the Aufhebung, its counterpart,
dialectical reasoning, allows one to explore the exact opposite by reasoning backwards
from this act of becoming to discover what was negated, and what was preserved or
elevated, in this process.27 In regards to this negative aspect of the dialectic, Hegel states:
Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate
is therewith posited as mediated, as referred to an other, or that the universal is posited as a
particular. The second universal that has thereby arisen is thus the negative of that first and, in
view of subsequent developments, the first negative. From this negative side, the immediate
has perished in the other; but the other is essentially not an empty negative, the nothing which
is formally taken to be the result of dialectic, but is rather the other of the first, the negative of
the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated – contains as such the determination
of the first in it.28
Dialectical reasoning matters in our exploration of Westphal’s use of the Aufhebung since
it shows how the Aufhebung can be deconstructed: rather than two opposing concepts
moving to create a new idea, one can also reason from the final idea to the two opposing
concepts which created it. Westphal’s use of the Aufhebung works against this dialectical
aspect in that what concepts he elevates, or suspends, into another concept cannot be
dialectically reasoned back to the moment of sublation since they are not contradictory,
antithetical concepts. For example, when Westphal claims that the teleological suspension
of the ethical in Fear and Trembling is synonymous with the concept of Aufhebung,
Westphal does not show how the ethical is directly antithetical to the religious and thus
one cannot employ dialectical reasoning to reveal the moment of sublation of the ethical
into the religious. His use of the term through Kierkegaard, as we shall see, lacks this
opposition and thus is not exactly an Aufhebung in the Hegelian sense of the term. Rather,
Westphal recontextualizes Hegel’s Aufhebung so that he can employ it in his thinking and
connect opposing (yet are still are not antithetical) concepts.
Through exploring Hegel’s concept of determinate being, we have thus come to the
following understanding of Aufhebung: two distinct, opposing and antithetical (hence,
related) concepts pass through a moment together in which each immediately cancels out
the other while also simultaneously preserving the essential, elemental ‘concept’ which
formed the union in the first place. This preservation, while negating that which initially
caused the opposition, elevates the essential, elemental concept in so much as what is
preserved holds a different, rational status. This status, as seen in the example of a
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 5
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determinate being, still holds a hint of the negation in so far as the primary opposites (pure
being and pure nothing) can be dialectically traced back to the moment before the
sublation (hence, why it is a speculative-rational moment). Clearly, this is a difficult
term which resists a succinct definition, but the explanation and summary above has now
given us enough of a foothold on the term for us to move onto how Westphal utilizes it
and how he sees it working within the writings of others, particularly Kierkegaard who
has often been labeled as Hegel’s greatest critic and historical counterpoint.
Westphal’s Aufhebung: a suspension of Hegel in Kierkegaard?
As we have previously noted, Westphal uses Aufhebung throughout his work and not only
within Hegel. Some of his first uses of the term come from his work directly on Hegel in
Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity. This book is a good starting point for our exploration of
his use of Aufhebung since it will give us a baseline by revealing that his original use of
the term is in line with Hegel’s own use. Once we have confirmed Westphal’s original
comprehension of the Aufhebung in Hegel, we will then briefly examine how it works
within Westphal’s Kierkegaardian thought by dissecting the use of the term in his account
of Kierkegaard’s theory of stages. Once we see how it is used in his Kierkegaardian
thought, we will then briefly touch upon its use in his philosophy as a whole. However, in
keeping with our stated goal of seeing how Westphal appropriates his sources, we will not
get into the deeper themes and ideas which run through these works. Rather, we will stick
with an exploration of Aufhebung with only small explanations and summaries of the
context in which it is used.
Merold Westphal’s 1991 address to the Hegel Society of America, expanded upon and
included as the tenth chapter to Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity, is an examination of
Hegel’s theory that society, in its proper function, is an Aufhebung of church (religion) and
state articulated through the term Sittlichkeit.29 He sets up this Aufhebung by quoting
Hegel, stating that he repeatedly claims ‘religion is the foundation of the state’ and that
‘the state is the foundation of religion.’30 Not unlike Hegel’s understanding of being and
nothingness, both hold to the fact that the other is united but different, as in two sides of
the same coin and without the other side, there is no coin. From these two quotes,
Westphal then pivots from Hegel toward his own socio-historical context in 1991, at the
end of both the Cold War and the Gulf War, in order to reflect upon what he sees as
opposing yet inextricably linked forces at work within civil and political society.
Westphal articulates these opposing forces as ‘old secularism’ and ‘new theocracy,’
both of which inhabit the same respective placeholders as Hegel’s concepts of state and
religion.31 Westphal’s aim in coining the term old secularism is that he wishes to highlight
how the state’s current movement toward ‘absolutizing pre-ethical goods’ – namely,
pleasure (food, sex), wealth (materialism), and honor (social class, prestige) – is indeed
an old thread which has been woven within the function of the state for some time;
particularly in economics and politics.32 Autonomy, without moral (i.e. religious) con-
straints, emerges as the primary motivator of the state – as ‘central to the pursuit of wealth
and status’ which also reveals that old secularism, in its deification of pleasure, wealth,
and honor, is liable to the charge of idolatry itself. Or, in the case of its instrumental use of
religion, it can often perversely fashion a god as an enabler of our desires.33
In opposition to old secularism, Westphal describes a new theocracy arising as an
‘ethico-religious’ movement popularly known through its ‘charismatic television person-
alities and massive, computerized direct-mail fund raisers’ which became known as ‘the
Moral Majority,’ a political movement in the 1980s and 1990s based upon religious,
6 J. Sands
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‘family values’ type rhetoric.34 Their emphasis on morality rather than religion puts them
on equal footing with old secularism’s absolutization of pre-ethical goods (as mentioned
above), thus setting up a ‘good versus evil’ narrative which makes the new theocracy the
advocate for ‘right’ morality. Westphal, in line with his caveats toward using the term ‘old
secularism,’ recognizes the differences between traditional theocracy and his use of the
term here; he recognizes that none of these people wish to establish a state church, for
example. However, he does note that ‘the spirit of theocracy is present’ in their political
actions and influence, particularly in their appeal to religious authority and political
action.35
However, in their ethico-religious protest, the new theocracy echoes old secularism’s
sectarian pursuit of personal interest by advocating a ‘selective morality,’ that is, a
morality that only appeals to the tastes and causes that reflect their own.36 They are
against those aforementioned pre-ethical goods, but only selectively and when it is in their
self-interest to do so. Therefore, in their distaste for old secularism’s sexual revolution, for
example, the new theocracy comes out tenfold to protest, but when it comes to challenge
other ethical offenses such as the unreserved pursuit of wealth and status, it actually
moralizes those pursuits and reframes them as godly, making itself just as idolatrous.37
The result of this idolization is an approving god for our personal pursuits where Westphal
sarcastically exclaims, ‘God wants us to be rich, personally and nationally, and God wants
us to have a bigger military budget, for we are the shining city set on a hill to save the
world from the evil empire.’38
Hegel enters the scene for Westphal via his notion of Sittlichkeit, which is a sublation
of private, personal religion into a common sense of reason, which creates an ethical
society; often expressed and understood through the customs and mores of that society. In
the case of old secularism and new theocracy, Westphal notes that each opposes the other
not as contradictions, where one ‘must be true, but as contraries, both of which may be,
and in this case are, false.’39 Through his prior quotations of Hegel that church and state
must be separate but are also inseparable, Westphal first peels back any idea that Hegel
would support a theocratic state, which runs contrary to his concept of freedom, the very
essence of the state’s existence.40 This results, more or less, in a comparative relationship
between old secularity to Hegel’s concept of a purely secular state.
Yet just as the relationship is established, Westphal retreats from the notion that
Hegel’s understanding of Sittlichkeit would support an entirely secular enterprise given
that, just like the new theocracy, old secularism is ‘only selectively critical of the primacy
given to pre-ethical goods.’41 Moreover, and again in line with the critique of new
theocracy, old secularism – through its unchallenged elevation of certain pre-ethical
goods such as pleasure, wealth, and honor – encourages a de facto ‘civil religion which
hovers around the fringes of political life and in the churchly religion which hovers
around the fringes of everyday life in general;’ paradoxically, and as foreshadowed by the
critique of idolatry, old secularism has turned into a self-legitimating religion whose
foundation is just as inept as new theocracy.42 Thus, for Westphal, old secularity and
new theocracy are contrary opposites but not such that the denial of one entails the
affirmation of the other.
For Westphal, these oppositions show what can go awry when a society overly
concerns itself with either being too secular or too religious: idolatrous self-legitimization
and selective enforcement of principles43 go unchecked in both, inevitably leading to an
unjust and unequal society. In contradistinction, Hegelian Sittlichkeit gives the state an
ethical foundation which unites the core principles of religious life with that of the greater
society. With regards to old secularism and new theocracy, he utilizes the well-established
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 7
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self-legitimizing nature which unites them to show that in their unity the inherent paradox
– that each holds an opposing, cynically pious pursuit of selfish fulfillment – is cancelled
out. What is preserved, however, is ‘the ethical,’ or the individual-communal desire for
orchestrating a cohesive theory of governance.44 Westphal argues that the ethical which is
described here is a version of Hegelian Sittlichkeit. Describing it as such, Westphal
declares thus:
Correspondingly, the state is not to be the instrumentalism of the secular life but its
Aufhebung. The universal principle of truth which is known in religion to permeate all the
particular realms of national life, lest they be, in separation from the truth, barren, cursed like
the fig tree without figs, appearance without reality. This critique of secularity of the old
secularism is also the critique of its idolatry. The Aufhebung of secular life in the Hegelian
state, whose foundation is religion, is the systematic de-absolutizing of pre-ethical goods and
their subordination to and incorporation into a life determined by ethico-religious values.45
For Westphal, old secularism and new theocracy are but current versions of an existing
problem in modernity, and Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, ‘as the ethico-religious Aufhebung of pre-
ethical goods into their truly human form’ serves as theory of the state which holds up the
best of what these contrary movements have in common while negating their destructive
self-interests. Note well that this negation/preservation happens within their unity and not
by virtue of an outside source. What is significant for us is not Westphal’s correlation of
contemporary politics and religion, nor his creative use of Hegel to describe them and to
address a remedy through Hegel’s Sittlichkeit – though this does further expand upon the
political concerns which permeate all of Westphal’s philosophy. Rather, what we can see
here is an example of Westphal using Hegel’s Aufhebung in a manner somewhat faithful
to Hegel himself. This is relevant because we now can see that his use of the term in his
later work is intentional and deliberate and that he is, in the vein of despoilment, taking
the term from Hegel and making it his own.46
Now that we have established a baseline for his understanding of Aufhebung, let us
transition toward how he uses it in more novel and personal instances by looking at his
Kierkegaard scholarship. In what follows, we will briefly summarize Westphal’s reading
of Kierkegaard’s teleological suspensions within his theory of stages. Once we understand
how Westphal sees a direct link between Aufhebung in Hegel and the teleological
suspension in Kierkegaard, we will then contrast this with our previous exploration of
Hegel’s use of the term in order to show how Westphal has recontextualized the term for
his own purposes.
Interestingly, Westphal’s primary use of Aufhebung centers on a critique of Hegelian
Sittlichkeit as the end point of our religiously based ethics. Throughout much of his
scholarship, Westphal focuses on Kierkegaard’s critique against Hegelian ethics, and
particularly against Sittlichkeit – which is a direct challenge to what we have detailed
above. In numerous places, Westphal will directly relate Sittlichkeit to Christendom.47
Moreover, Westphal often finds himself agreeing with Kierkegaard on the idea that one
must go beyond Sittlichkeit (or, in Kierkegaard’s words, ‘the ethical’) to get to a truly
religious-based morality which places faith in, and obedience toward, God above all
political, secular ethical systems.
One of the surprising ways in which Westphal explores this critique of Sittlichkeit is
through the interplay between Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous ‘authors.’ Westphal is always
cognizant of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship and he always addresses each
pseudonym as an individual voice in a much larger discussion.48 In this vein,
Westphal’s work addresses the Kierkegaardian corpus as a whole and as such he teases
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out prevailing themes which run through it. It is as if Kierkegaard were performing a
dialogue with himself and Westphal is moderating it for us readers.49 Therefore, he sees
author Judge William in Either/Or discussing Hegelian Sittlichkeit, which informs him of
the idea of the ethical that is taken up by Johannes De Silentio in Fear in Trembling.
Moreover, the teleological suspension in Fear and Trembling informs him of the tele-
ological suspensions first seen in Frater Taciturnus’ section in Stages on Life’s Way and
further expounded upon in Johannes Climacus’ Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
Lastly, all of these works culminate in Kierkegaard’s self-authored Works of Love,
where Kierkegaard details how the ‘Love Commandment,’ that you shall love God
above all things and your neighbor as yourself, is the highest act of faith and a task of
a lifetime. Thus, Westphal sees not just a dialogue that functions as (anti-)Hegelian
commentary but one which reaches its conclusion through the voice of the primary
author, Kierkegaard, himself.50
With regards to our present concern with Aufhebung, Westphal introduces this through
the account of marriage in Either/Or, in which he highlights how author Judge William
describes the concept of sex within marriage as a form of ethical Sittlichkeit. For Judge
William, this is where the sensual, pleasure-seeking desires of sex are ‘ennobled’ through
marriage which is ‘the transfiguration of the first love [i.e. esthetic love, sex] and not its
annihilation.’51 In this sense, sexual pleasure is seen as a pre-ethical good which is
aufgehoben in marriage as an ethical, or ‘rightly ordered’ act. Marriage elevates –
transfigures even – sexual desire into something beautiful, just, and worthy. This is
especially Hegelian and it leads Westphal to argue that Judge William is a Hegelian,
‘whether he knows it or not.’52 In Philosophy of Right, for example, Hegel notes that
‘marriage, as the elementary social relation, contains firstly the factor of natural life’ and
that ‘marriage is essentially an ethical relation.’53 He goes on to remark that various
accounts of marriage’s relation to the foundation of the state are inadequate because they
do not take into view the loving aspect of the relationship. Additionally, traditional
thoughts on love as the foundation of marriage are also woefully inadequate.54 This
leads Hegel to remark that ‘the ethical side of marriage consists in the consciousness
that the union is a substantive end. Marriage thus rests upon love, confidence, and the
socializing of the whole individual existence.’55 Thus, it is an Aufhebung of the pre-ethical
sexual desire, transfigured in love between the couple and ennobled in duty towards the
family and state.
According to Westphal, this is exactly the form of the ethical which is teleologically
suspended in Fear and Trembling, where author Johannes De Silentio remarks that
Abraham must suspend the ethical in order to follow God’s command to sacrifice Isaac.
According to Westphal, de Silentio’s commentary in Fear and Trembling marks the
‘transition from the ethical to the religious’ where ‘Judge William falls short of the
religious’ through his fidelity to the ethical. His adherence to Sittlichkeit can only take
him so far, and it definitely cannot take him with Abraham toward Mount Moriah. The
ethical, therefore, must be teleologically suspended in order for this journey to happen. On
this matter, Westphal is explicit, stating that this suspension is ‘nothing but a Hegelian
Aufhebung, in this case the relativizing of the ethical by recontextualizing it within the
religious as its higher principle. But while the form of this teleological suspension is
Hegelian, its content is anti-Hegelian, for it is an all-out assault on the Hegelian under-
standing of Sittlichkeit.’56
How de Silentio remedies the epistemological ramifications of suspending the ethical
– a mediated, reasoned ethics – into the religious is beyond our current scope.57 What is
important to us now is that this becomes the paradigm for how Westphal sees the
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subsequent teleological suspensions in Kierkegaard’s writings. Westphal elaborates on this
particular form of Aufhebung:
. . .Another Hegelian name for such mediation is Aufhebung; in the language of Fear and
Trembling, we are talking about a teleological suspension. In both cases the process of
recontextualization has negative and positive implications, cancellation and preservation.
When X is aufgehoben, or teleologically suspended in Y, the immediate, self-sufficient
form of X is canceled, and whatever belongs to that mode of its being is relativized as
something insufficient by itself. But this has positive significance, for the claim is that Y is
the truth, or telos, of X, and that in this process X realizes itself, or at least moves to a higher
level of its normative development.58
Westphal sees an X which is taken up and recontextualized within Y which thereby
cancels or negates the telos of X – the true purpose or end goal for X, in this case a social
ethics which bases justice and righteousness upon the highest good through men59 – while
preserving some aspect of X. In other words, the aim of the ethical towards the good and
righteous is preserved, recontextualized, and taken up into the religious. The self’s walk
towards righteousness falls short in and of itself due to humanity’s fallen nature; however,
when the self surrenders its claim on righteousness to God, then and only then can it truly
feel that it is on the path towards righteousness because the self is following God first and
its own intellect second. This is why Abraham takes up his task and follows God’s
command towards Mount Moriah.
Two things are striking about Westphal’s reading: First, it is remarkable and
enlightening to see how Kierkegaard undoes Hegel’s work through Hegel himself.
This reading of Kierkegaard reveals the Dane’s ingenious wit and clever critique by at
once showing how Hegel is the greatest philosopher of them all while also showing
that Hegel is still but a fallen man when compared to God and revelation.60 In this
way, Hegel is not wrong but he is not right either; his concepts of Sittlichkeit and
Aufhebung are correct when he talks about taking up and elevating a base notion, such
as pre-ethical desires, but they fail once they mistake the true telos of the self (or
selves) as free, ethical communal living, when it is in truth to love God above all
things and to love your neighbor as yourself.61
This leads to the second striking element of Westphal’s reading: that this is not really
an Aufhebung in the strict Hegelian sense. In this reading, X and Y are not paradoxes of
each other. Nowhere in Westphal’s account (nor in Kierkegaard’s) is the religious or
anything else paradoxically equated but contrary to the ethical. In Hegel’s account of
becoming, pure nothingness and pure being were exactly contraries. In his account of
Sittlichkeit, this was somewhat or partially so in that private religious sentiment and
secular social ethics were equal in their aims (how should I live?) but contrary in their
executions and goals. But in the teleological suspension of the ethical – if it is indeed
Sittlichkeit as Westphal argues – the religious is hardly on par with the ethical as an
opposing force and making it into a dialectic somewhat softens Kierkegaard’s critique of
the ethical.
Westphal’s rebuttal to this, I imagine, would follow that it was on par once Abraham
received the command from God. ‘Should I follow what I’ve been told is right – which is
to not kill my children,’ Abraham would have said to himself, ‘or should I follow what
my God tells me to do, with the hope that God will give Abraham back to me or somehow
make this all ok?’ Westphal might argue that this dilemma poses Sittlichkeit and the
ethical against the religious command to follow God. At the onset, this makes sense:
Sittlichkeit is negated but is preserved in the justness of God and the religious is also
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thereby lifted into righteousness because it suspends all human ethics within faith and
duty toward God. This is indeed tenable and possible.
However, is it tenable throughout Kierkegaard scholarship? That is a much more
difficult question. As we have previously covered, Westphal argues that this teleological
suspension is a paradigm which Kierkegaard follows throughout his work, particularly in
his theory of stages (or, as it is alternately called, spheres of existence). Recall that the
esthetic (pre-ethical) is teleologically suspended in the ethical, which is then suspended in
Religiousness A, which is then suspended in Religiousness B, and finally completed in
Religiousness C. For Westphal, all of these follow the exact same pattern of suspension/
Aufhebung as seen in de Silentio’s Fear and Trembling. But again, what are the contraries
in these patterns?62 The critical questions thus become: How and in what way does X
negate Y? And, once Y has taken up X, from where can we logically deduce this moment
of sublation? Furthermore, it appears as if Westphal’s use of Aufhebung often forgets the
necessity of negation in the process. It almost reads quasi-escatological where all things
get taken up or otherwise reconciled into a higher, (more) complete purpose. Is there an
actual negation happening in an Westphalian Aufhebung or is it all merely suspension?
Sometimes it can be hard to tell.
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard addresses Hegel’s use of
Aufhebung as a philosophical term through the pseudonym Johannes Climacus.
Exploring Climacus’ critique thus should provide clarification in regards to how
Kierkegaard himself perceived the relationship between his teleological suspension
and Hegel’s Aufhebung. Following Hegel, Climacus places the concept within the
realm of subjective thinking and inward speculation, and then he focuses on how it
is perceived in Christian thinking and particularly in relation to the paradox of
Christianity. What is at stake, for Climacus, is how the concept of Aufhebung, through
its suspension of ‘various and indeed opposite meanings,’ functions as an explanation
of paradox, which thus renders Christianity as something one can reasonably
understand.63 In regards to Christianity, Hegel’s Aufhebung represents a hubristic
attempt to logically grasp the truth held within the paradox of Jesus Christ. The
speculative nature of Aufhebung, Climacus argues, reduces the paradox to a relation
of opposites, which makes the paradox logical, thus no longer rendering it as a
paradox. ‘But suppose,’ Climacus states, ‘that we let the word aufheben mean reduc-
tion to a relative factor, as indeed it does when what is decisive, the paradox, is
reduced to a relative factor. What this says is that there is no paradox, no decision, for
the paradox and the decisive are what they are precisely by being unyielding.’64 For
Climacus, the problem with this form of speculation, as employed within Hegel’s
concept of Aufhebung, is not that it renders Christianity, and the paradox of Jesus as
divine yet man (the primary paradox of Christianity, for Climacus), as false or untrue.
It is quite the opposite. Climacus’ primary concern is that such speculation has the
audacity to believe that it can grasp and logically understand this paradox, thus
missing the point of Christianity altogether.65 Relating this back to our exploration
of determinate being in the prior section, Climacus might agree with Hegel that there is
a paradox between the relation of being and non-being; however, he would criticize the
reduction of becoming, or of the creation of determinate being, into this simple act of
negation-preservation. There is more happening, for Climacus, in becoming than a
simple movement of being passing over into non-being. While Hegel himself acknowl-
edges that this is an abstract understanding of being, it still attempts to know too much,
and it assumes that the paradox can be understood – thus making it no longer a
paradox.
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Climacus argues that this is a matter of gullibility. Specifically regarding Christianity,
these thinkers of great intellect have mistaken their logic as the truth rather than the actual
truth of the paradox of Christianity, which comes almost as a natural acceptance for the
average Christian.66 One might kindly say that they have over thought the paradox, in a
less charitable fashion, one might argue that they have tried to seize the truth of
Christianity as their own:
For Christianity as it is understood by the speculator differs from what plain folk are
presented. [For the plain folk] it is a paradox, but the speculator knows how to suspend
the paradox. So it is not the Christianity that is, was and remains the truth, and the
speculator’s understanding is not that Christianity is the truth; no, Christianity’s truth is the
speculator’s understanding of Christianity. The understanding is thus something other than
the truth; it is not that once the understanding has understood everything contained in the
truth, then truth is understood. . . The truth is not first given and its understanding what
one then awaits; what is awaited is the completion of the speculative understanding as
that which alone can bring about the truth. Speculative knowledge thus differs from
knowledge in general, as something indifferent to what is known, so that the latter does
not change by being known but stays the same. No, speculative knowledge is itself the
object of knowing.67
Climacus thus makes it clear that he has concerns about the use of Aufhebung to properly
understand the paradox of Christianity, and this perhaps explains why he forgoes the use
of the term in describing his theory of stages. It would be philosophically inconsistent to
critique the speculator’s use of Aufhebung to remove, or to ‘render out,’ the logical
impossibility of the paradox, and then to go on to explain how one arrives at the paradox
of Christianity through a process of stages which are aufgehoben in each other. This
reveals a particular concern missing in Westphal’s argument that the teleological suspen-
sion and Aufhebung are synonymous concepts: he does not explain why, if this is true,
Kierkegaard opted to call these transitions teleological suspensions. As one can see with
the passage above, Climacus’ concern with Aufhebung runs parallel to De Silentio’s
concern against Sittlichkeit: Hegel is not wrong, but he is not right either. Through
Aufhebung, Hegel and his followers make the correct observation there is a dialectical
relation between opposing concepts, but they fool themselves once they mistake this
observation as a method to understand, explain, or grasp the full truth of the paradox
within this dialectical relation, particularly and especially within the paradox of
Christianity and the dual nature of Jesus.
Westphal has received similar critiques from Jack Mulder, who argues against
Westphal’s belief that the teleological suspension completes any dialectical movement
in and of itself, and Henry Piper, who argues that Westphal is wrongly fashioning
Kierkegaard as a quasi-Hegelian.68 Mulder and Piper’s arguments vary, but the
covalent element of their critique is Westphal’s use of Hegel to understand
Kierkegaard: either Westphal reads Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms too dialectically, as
if they are Hegelian progressions of Kierkegaard’s thinking, or he reads the tele-
ological suspensions too dialectically, as if the suspensions themselves ‘complete’ the
progression on life’s way or that the self can otherwise ‘return’ to a respective sphere
as if it were a Hegelian dialectic.69 In Westphal’s rebuttal, he does not revise his
position but essentially retraces his steps as we have detailed above.70 Debates about
the proper reading of Kierkegaard aside, what is important to our own investigation
comes into view when Westphal addresses Piper’s concern that Kierkegaard is not a
Hegelian:
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So [after restating/proving that Kierkegaard is indeed using Hegelian themes, as seen with
Judge William], a more careful formulation than “Kierkegaard is not Hegelian” would be that
Kierkegaard is not substantively Hegelian even when he (or his pseudonyms) employ
Hegelian forms. The question is about the how: are these forms employed as Hegel employs
them? Piper understands this when distinguishing the ‘logical dialectic of Hegel from the
‘non-dialectical,’ ‘existential’ dialectic of Kierkegaard. The difference is between a dialectic
in which differences are ‘mediated’ and brought to ‘resolution’ and one in which they remain
in ‘tension’ and ‘paradox.’71
Hegel does not have the final say on how Hegel’s concepts can be used, according to
Westphal. To say that something is ‘Hegelian’ does not have to mean that it is Hegelian in
the proper sense: the dialectic does not need to find resolution but can be in tension and
taken up by another Aufhebung. Here, Westphal reveals himself as a despoiler of Hegel.
Hegel no longer has control over these concepts, and while we should understand and be
mindful of the way in which Hegel himself used these terms, we can see that their use is
not merely limited to a rigorous use of them. This is not to say that we can do whatever
we want with concepts such as Aufhebung, for indeed they do have a legacy and to ignore
their original use is to abuse them. A proper appropriation is mindful of this legacy while
exploring its possibilities; appropriation explores the tension within the concept’s original
meaning and context in relation to our own while not breaking it. Lastly, this existing
tension explores the elasticity of the term up by placing its original meaning in relation to
a contemporary, evolving usage: Hegel’s Aufhebung is taken up by Kierkegaard’s usage of
the term (and in Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel) which is then taken up by Westphal and
his own philosophy.
Stepping back for a moment, is this not what Hegel did with the term Aufhebung
itself? In our first exploration of Hegel’s use, we noted that he himself regarded the
common German usage of the term insightful itself and he philosophically exploited the
term. He took the term in its everyday form and explored its philosophical ‘usefulness’ to
understanding how things are; thereby cancelling out its everyday usage for a higher
purpose. The everyday, common Aufhebung is – once its paradox is genuinely reflected
upon – aufgehoben into a philosophical Aufhebung! The unity of the sublation here is the
notion of paradox itself: on the one hand from the common, everyday perspective in
which contrary actions have practical meaning (to pick up a fallen book), and on the other
side from a theoretical perspective in which paradoxes have a different but similar
meaning (to say yes and no to the same question, such as: ‘Is Jesus Christ a man or
God?’). The fact that the sublation itself happens within the term itself and with no
external additions (or, in this case, prefixes or suffixes) completes this idea.
Now, it would be perfectly sane to argue that this notion is grasping at straws and that
this is a bit of linguistic sophistry – a charge that has been levied by several against Hegel
himself.72 Additionally, it could be argued that stretching a term to its limits – or, as I did
above, turning a term against itself – is bad philosophy in the sense that it eschews rigor
and fidelity for a (faulty) attempt at finding meaning and understanding. Philosophy
requires and demands from its practitioners a certain rigor in order to prevent concepts
from falling into etymological word-play and nonsense.
Westphal, for his part, does not see this as softening or weakening rigor for the sake of
finding understanding.73 Rather, it is about being mindful of the sources and then
recognizing the tension already within the term itself. Throughout his Kierkegaard
scholarship, Westphal has, with remarkable consistency, characterized the connections
and tensions between Kierkegaard and Hegel, and his prior expertise in Hegel is
undoubtedly the catalyst to this reading. It ultimately comes down to whether you find
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his claims convincing or not. Moreover, his own philosophy of religion may hinge upon
whether or not you grant him this understanding of Aufhebung since it runs throughout all
of his work and indeed even builds the structure of his work.
Desmond is right to claim that Westphal uses Aufhebung to do work – profound and
benign work – for him and that there is a degree of appropriation/despoilment within his
use of the term and in his philosophy as a whole. But he does not arrive at this on the
cheap: there is still a great admiration towards the Pharaoh and towards his sources and he
does not blindly take from them. Rather, as Desmond notes, it is a gentle and agreeable
despoilment. Yet, unlike the Pharaoh/Israel metaphor employed here, this is always a three
part dialogue between X, Y, and Westphal himself. The term dialogue could not be more
important, because for Westphal, what is happening here is grounded in hermeneutics
which at once appropriates but also sticks close to its source: ‘what does X say to Y, what
is or would be negated in their dialogue, and what could be taken up from it into my own
thought?’ Westphal’s philosophy is, therefore, always a recontextualization of his sources
into something else, something higher. However, it is a particular type of recontextualiza-
tion, it is a Westphalian Aufhebung.
Notes
1. Westphal, Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity. This book will heretofore be referenced as HFM.
On the very first page, Westphal abruptly declares that we are all still modernists: ‘Hegel has
exploded from oblivion (in the English-speaking world) to regain a major place in the
philosophical canon [which] has also been a time in which modernity has become increasingly
problematic to us moderns. . . . I speak of us as moderns because I cannot deny my modernity
any more than I can deny my Americanness’ (HFM, vii).
This is evident throughout his work, particularly when he treats Kierkegaard as a post-
modernist and when he discusses the role of suspicion in philosophy as a phenomenon which
began in modernity itself, not something that came after modernity (for examples, see:
Westphal, ‘Johannes and Johannes: Kierkegaard and Difference’, 13–16; ‘Appropriating
Postmodernism’ and ‘Nietzsche as a Theological Resource’ in OCOT.
2. Putt, Gazing Through a Prism Darkly, 21–3. This book will heretofore be referenced as
GTPD. Desmond, in a meaningful turn of phrase, references the despoilment of the
Egyptians by the Israelites (Exodus 3:21–2, 11:2–3, 12:35–6, and Psalm 105:37) who carried
Egyptian treasure with them during their flight from Egypt. His intent, here, is playful but also
evocative of Westphal’s roots in scripture and the relationship he has between his biblical faith
and his politics.
3. On 26 of GTPD, Desmond elaborates that there is indeed still a critique in Westphal’s
engagement, but in taking aspects of his subject’s thought up into his own, he changes the
nature of the critique: ‘After all, even gently despoiling the Egyptians is still despoiling, and
none of this would be possible at all did not need assert itself to escape the land of Pharaoh
[i.e. to leave an author behind]. To be critical is not necessarily to wish to be done with the one
who is opposed. . . . There can be a kind of adieu in criticism, but adieu is not only a good-
bye; it is also a kind of blessing.’
4. GTPD, 23.
5. Here are three key examples where Westphal plainly states that the teleological suspension and
the Aufheben are similar, if not essentially the same concept:
‘A teleological suspension is not a reduction. It does not say that X is nothing but Y. It is
rather an Aufhebung. It says that X can only be properly understood in relation to Y, that X is
not a substance in Spinoza’s sense, something that “in itself is conceived through itself”
(Ethics I, Def. 3).’ From: Westphal, Levinas and Kierkegaard in Dialogue, 47. This book
will heretofore be referenced as LKD.
‘I take Hegel’s Aufhebung and Kierkegaard’s teleological suspension to be closely related
ways of speaking about recontextualizing the abstract in the more fully concrete setting that is
its proper home. The earlier stages are not abandoned but are required to abandon any pretense
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of finality or self-sufficiency.’ Westphal, Transcendence and Self-Transcendence, 11 fn 29.
This book will heretofore be referenced as TST.
‘For like the ethical, the religious involves the replacing of a chasm with a chiasm. And he
might well have spoken of faith as a mediation, for Aufhebung and teleological suspension are
different names for the same structure.’ (Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard and the Role of Reflection in
Second Immediacy,’ 174.)
6. Calling this a ‘Westphalian Aufhebung’ should not conflate Merold Westphal’s thought with
the Germanic region of Westphalia or the treaty, The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the
Thirty Years’ War. The neologism is used here to separate Merold Westphal’s Aufhebung from
Hegel’s own usage and those who use it in Hegel’s own manner. Thus the connection between
Westphal’s surname and the area is coincidental and the author of this essay is not connecting
him to the region or the Peace of Westphalia.
7. Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation: A Critical Interpretation, 1–2, 8, 13–15. In: http://limo.
libis.be/primo_library/libweb/action/dlSearch.do?dscnt=1&onCampus=true&query=any%
2Ccontains%2CRalph+Palm&tab=default_tab&dstmp=1399893533029&dym=true&qb=
1399893532.58500&highlight=true&lang=eng&search_scope=Lirias&indx=1&bulkSize=
10&vid=Lirias&institution=ASSOC&fromLogin=true (accessed 12 May 2014). Ralph Palm’s
work was a valuable resource in understanding Hegel’s meaning of this term and his disserta-
tion is a vital resource – along with Hegel and Westphal themselves – for our exploration.
With regards to its resistance towards translation, Palm gives a valuable anecdote (p. 1 fn. 2) in
which the translators of Geraets, Suchting, and Harris had such a dispute over translating the
term in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic that they had to produce two different introductions to
the work. See: Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical
Sciences with the Zusätze, xxvi, xxxv-xxxvi. See also: Palm, ‘Hegel’s Contradictions’.
8. For the sake of clarity, I will continue to use only Aufhebung except when specifically
discussing its other forms, since Westphal’s own work often refers to the term as Aufhebung.
9. Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 8. The three instances are: PS, 68 (HW 3/94-TM); EL,
154 (HW 8/204–205); SL, 107 (HW/114). The third of these instances pertains to the
differences between the first and second editions of the Science of Logic. Note that this is
Hegel’s explanation of the term, not its usage!
10. Hegel, Science of Logic, 82 (SL 107; HW 5/114-EA), emphasis mine. In order to give easy
references to those who are not Hegel specialists, I will cite direct quotations from Di
Giovanni’s new translation of the Science of Logic while also making every effort to cite
other translations when referencing secondary sources such as Ralph Palm.
11. Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Taken from Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 9.
12. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. Di Giovanni, 82 (SL 107 [HW 5/114-EA]).
13. Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 30. The use of Aufhebung here is understood as
speculative or infinite reasoning, according to Hegel, in so far as its relation to thinking
and metaphysics. In The Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel distinguishes infinite reason from the
finite reason that dominated philosophy prior to Kant. This finite form of reasoning had
not yet understood what reason could or could not do (which is why Kant’s critique of
reason was so important for Hegel), and thus took for granted that one could reason about
things-in-themselves with no attention to their predicates or relation to other things (EL
§26–27). ‘The presupposition of the older metaphysics,’ Hegel summarizes, ‘was that of
the naïve belief generally, namely, that thinking grasps what things are in-themselves, that
things only are what they genuinely are when they are [captured] in thought’ (EL §28Z).
In this manner, older metaphysics took up ‘the abstract determinations of thought imme-
diately,’ which allowed the thinker to consider these predicates – these attachments to the
thing-in-itself under consideration – as a part of what makes the thing a thing, what makes
it ‘true’ as a thing in relation to the thinker (EL §28Z).
In contrast, speculative thought after Kant opens the thing in question to be considered from
an ‘infinite form of reason’ by expressing that the thing in question has certain qualities that
cannot ‘be brought to consciousness through what is finite;’ i.e. the thinker cannot fully bring
about the abstract qualities of the thing in question through rationalization (EL §28Z). Infinite
thinking thus turns inward toward speculation, and sublates this acknowledgment of finite
thinking, accepting its limitations – what reason can and cannot do – while also cancelling
these limitations in respect to finite thinking’s naiveté (that it can think of things-in-them-
selves), which allows the thinker to proceed toward an infinite speculation of the thing in itself.
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In this way, one transitions from thinking about things-in-themselves to thinking about
thinking, which thus makes this an infinite form of thinking for Hegel: there is no limiting
opposition when one is thinking about thinking since no object stands over against cognition
as that which is not-cognition. Thus, Hegel states: ‘Infinite or speculative thinking, on the
contrary [to finite thinking’s restriction to determinations], makes determinations likewise, but,
in determining, in limiting, it sublates this defect again. Infinity must not be interpreted as an
abstract, ever-receding beyond’ but in a simple manner of negation of limitation while
cognizant of those limitations (EL §28Z). Quotes are from: Hegel, GWF, The Encyclopaedia
Logic.
14. SL 82; HW 5/82; Hegel, The Science of Logic, 48, 59.
15. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 48.
16. Ibid., 59.
17. Ibid.
18. By ‘intuitive meaning,’ Hegel is referring to the initial, primal meaning of being and nothing-
ness. Intuition, and the verb intuit, refer to the basic meaning of these terms: that being
connotes that some-thing exists, and that nothing connotes that no-one-thing exists.
19. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60.
20. Ibid., 60–82. See also Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 42–56.
21. Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 51. Location here is to be understood as the paradox’s
position within the logical sequence of becoming.
22. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60 (cf. Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 51; Hegel, SL 83;
HW 5/83-EA).
23. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 80 (SL 105; HW 5/112-EA). Palm references this on 53–4,
remarking that ‘the determinate unity of being and nothing found in the transition to becoming
is thus constituted by sublation.’
24. Palm, Hegel’s Concept of Sublation, 56.
25. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 741–4.
26. Carlson, A Commentary on Hegel’s Science of Logic, 21.
27. See: Hegel, The Science of Logic, 744–6.
28. Ibid., 744 (12.245).
29. HFM, 165.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 166.
32. Ibid. In an aside on 166, Westphal readily admits that this is not the standard definition of
secularism and that by calling the concept in question old secularism his intention is ‘to call
attention to an important observable feature of the secularization process,’ namely its relation-
ship to the adage, ‘if God is dead everything is permitted.’
33. HFM, 168–169. On the point of idolatry, Westphal argues this is particularly clear in the case
of ‘nuclear nationalism,’ where ‘we are prepared to incinerate millions. . . simply because they
happen to belong to another people.’ Invoking the term holocaust, a religious word used to
denote burnt offerings and sacrifices for personal sins, he argues that it now stands for a
sacrifice to a different god: ‘If we ask who is the god to whom human life on this unprece-
dented scale, along with human civilization and the earth’s atmosphere, are to be sacrificed,
the answer is clear: the nation’ (169).
34. This American political movement was very popular in the 1980’s through the 1990’s – even
so much that then Vice President Dan Quayle evoked it when reprimanding the television
character Murphy Brown (in the eponymously titled show, ‘Murphy Brown’) for having a
baby out of wedlock. While Westphal’s example is dated, it still remains relevant given the rise
of popular conservative cable television news stations and conservative radio programs which
still trace their roots back to the so-called Moral Majority. For a history of its origins in the
1980’s, see: Bromley, and Shupe, New Christian Politics, ‘Part II: Sources of Social Support
for the New Christian Right,’ 61–113. For the specifically televangelical bent of this move-
ment, see Banwart, ‘Jerry Falwell, the Rise of the Moral Majority, and the 1980 Election,’.
35. HFM, 170.
36. Ibid., 172.
37. It appears, at least in this essay, that Westphal anticipated the ‘prosperity gospel’ movement
that emerged in the United States of America just a decade after this publishing.
38. HFM, 172.
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39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 172–4.
41. Ibid., 177.
42. Ibid.
43. Westphal goes on to call this a sectarian epistemology in order to denote that it is not just
society turning a blind eye towards its own principles, but it somehow comes to know and
understand the world only through this self-interested selectivity. We not only see what we
want to see, but our self-interest fools us into thinking that this is all there is to see; ‘this is
how the world works,’ we tell ourselves while being immune to knowing any alternatives.
‘Even if,’ Westphal states, ‘by accident, this does not happen at the level of social . . . praxis, it
has always already happened at the level of theory and of ‘truth’ insofar as the foundations
remain epistemologically sectarian. Society as a whole is subjected to rules which can be
expected to make sense only to those socialized into one of its subcultures’ (HFM, 174).
44. HFM, 178.
45. Ibid.
46. Stepping back for a moment, let us look at Westphal’s source material on religion’s role in the
state, which is primarily found in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in order to evaluate his grasp of
the term. In Section 270, Hegel details his notion of the state where, in the additional remark
(Zusatz), he notes that religion has its problems as a tool of indifference or, at worse,
oppression for people. However, religion’s necessity to the state can be seen ‘when we go
back to their conception,’ or before religion is taken up by the state (Hegel, GWF Philosophy
of Right, 206). ‘Religion has as its content absolute truth,’ Hegel continues, ‘and, therefore,
also the highest kind of feeling’ (Philosophy of Right, 206). Religion’s orientation towards
absolute truth found in God, as the ‘unlimited basis and cause of all things,’ lends itself to
becoming the foundation of the state’s ethics. On the other hand, the purely secular state
concerns itself with laws and duties, Hegel argues, which lends the ethical system its
determinate reality. ‘Religion, so interpreted,’ Hegel concludes, ‘is the foundation of the
ethical system, and contains the nature of the state as the divine will; yet it is only the
foundation. This is the point at which the state and religion separate. The state is the divine
will as a present spirit, which unfolds itself in the actual shape of an organized world’
(Philosophy of Right, 207). Hegel, here, is explicating the ethical system as an Aufhebung
of religion and the secular state, which Westphal then takes as the paradigm for his ‘old
secularism and new theocracy.’
47. LKD, 133: ‘Similarly, Kierkegaard’s positive account of the self is in ethical terms, for
example the absolute duty to God with which Silentio explicates the teleological suspension
of Sittlichkeit and Christendom.’ Additionally the following works will be referenced with the
corresponding initials: Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Religion and Society, will be cited
as KCRS; Westphal, Becoming a Self, will be cited as BS.
For more references, see also: LKD, 53–4, 72, 105, 106, 133–6, Fn. 18 on 160; KCRS, 76–
82, 109; BS, 29. These are but a few examples of a reoccurring theme.
48. Westphal, intentionally or unintentionally, is quite consistent on how he introduces his
concept of Kierkegaard’s teleological suspensions; it is as if he is always taking the
minority position – or at least talking to non-Kierkegaardian scholars – and therefore has
to explicate it nearly every time. Fortunately, for our purposes, this creates a pattern which
I detail in this paragraph. To simplify things, we will primarily examine Westphal’s thought
through Becoming a Self.
To see the pattern yourself, please see the following examples: LKD, 53–7; BS, 24–9, 91–3,
115–23, 154–8, 160–7,194–9; KCRS, 30–32, 76–83; TST, 207–13, 217–19; Westphal,
‘Johannes and Johannes: Kierkegaard and Difference’, 14–15, 19–25, 13–31; Westphal,
‘Kierkegaard and Hegel’, 76–101 (This essay, in addition to describing the complicated
relationship between these two thinkers, excellently describes how Westphal’s sees the con-
nections/dialogue between Kierkegaard’s ‘authors’ which develops into a cohesive narrative
and discussion on Hegelian concepts such as Sittlichkeit and Aufhebung).
For supporting instances, see also: Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard’s Teleological Suspension of
Religiousness B’, 111–14; Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard’s Religiousness C: A Defense’, 546–8;
Westphal, ‘Abraham and Sacrifice’, 320–1; Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard on Language and Spirit’,
78–9 [see also the dialogue between Westphal and other scholars on 87–8].
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49. For further elaboration on how these pseudonyms dialogue with each other, see: Westphal,
Merold, ‘Johannes and Johannes: Kierkegaard and Difference.’
50. Note the Hegelian character of Westphal’s reading of these ‘authors.’ For reference, the first
three chapters of Becoming a Self set the stage for Westphal’s method of reading
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, see especially: BS, 20–1, 25–6, 29–30. With regards to
Kierkegaard having the final say in Works of Love, Westphal will come to call this
Religiousness C, see: BS, 194–200.
51. BS, 24–25; He is quoting from Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part II, 31. See also Either/Or Part II,
21, 30, 56–7, 61, 94, 253.
52. Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard and Hegel,’ 106.
53. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §161; Westphal also uses this example of Marriage in HFM,
179–80.
54. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §162.
55. Ibid., §163.
56. BS, 26. For a restatement of this same principle, see: BS, 39.
57. See BS, 27–9, 62–4; KCRS, Chapter 6, ‘Kierkegaard and the Logic of Insanity; LKD, Chapter
3, “Teleological Suspensions.”’
58. BS, 145. The context in which Westphal raises this Aufhebung/teleological suspension com-
parison is in discussing the relationship between Philosophical Fragments and its postscript/
sequel, Concluding Unscientific Postscript. On 303–9 of Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(Cambridge Edition, 2009), Climacus – the author of both works – discusses the relationship
between Hegel and Christendom, particularly as regards ‘becoming’ a Christian through
baptism. The issue at hand is whether simply performing a ritual, such as infant baptism,
can actually legitimate the act of becoming Christian – the child has no say in the matter and
plenty of people have their children baptized merely because it is a custom. This raises
concerns for Climacus (and echoed by Westphal on 144–8 of Becoming a Self), about the
role of mediation in faith, particularly with respect to Sittlichkeit and its ‘regulating’ of faith.
See: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Chapter 4, Section 1.
59. The use of ‘men’ here is intentional since this ethics, Sittlichkeit (at least in Westphal’s view) is
often shaded in the biases and prejudices of the people who formed it. This means it is often
prejudiced toward particular races, genders, social classes and so on.
60. In ‘Kierkegaard and Hegel,’ (102) Westphal deftly draws this out to show how Kierkegaard is
simultaneously mocking and praising Hegel through his allegory of the dancer who could leap
so high that he thought he could fly (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 124). Here the dancer
represents Hegel (for Westphal) and the dancer can clearly leap higher than any other dancer,
much to his praise. To his downfall, however, he actually believes that his leaps give birth to
flight.
61. Westphal’s Kierkegaard is a Lutheran through and through: the self is lost when it forgets that
its soul faulted and can only be saved when its aim is toward loving and following God.
62. For example, when Religiousness A – a religious sentiment which aims for the divine yet
settles in self-legitimization/Sittlichkeit – is taken up by Religiousness B – a Christ-centered
religiousness, which focuses the believer towards living a Christ-like life – does it negate
anything within Jesus Christ or his teachings?
63. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 186.
64. Ibid., 187.
65. On 187 in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus states thus: ‘Speculation says by no
means that Christianity is untruth; on the contrary, it says that speculation grasps its truth.’
This, for Kierkegaard, is the greatest act of hubris one can have (see: 189–96).
66. While Climacus here regards this ‘average Christian’ as ‘plain folk,’ this is partially untrue; in
various places Kierkegaard will recall the difficulty that all Christians face in accepting the
paradox of Christianity and of Jesus’ nature, which is why Religiousness B comes at the end
of his theory of stages. However, here he is using the term as an idealized concept – like the
term ‘simple soul’ which he will use on 191 – to distance his concept of the true Christian
believer from the Danish Hegelians and their Christendom, who are the primary targets of his
critique.
67. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 187–8, emphasis is mine.
68. Mulder, ‘Re-radicalizing Kierkegaard: An Alternative to Religiousness C’; Piper,
‘Kierkegaard’s Non-Dialectical Dialectic or That Kierkegaard is not Hegelian’, 496–518.
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69. Mulder, ‘Re-Radicalizing Kierkegaard,’ 304, 309, 311–12, 314, 321; Piper, ‘Kierkegaard’s
Non-Dialectical Dialectic,’ 498–9, 503, 510–18.
70. Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard’s Religiousness C.’ For example, Westphal asks ‘is it not evident that
a teleological suspension has the form of an Hegelian Aufhebung?’ and that while ‘Judge
William does not use the language of teleological suspension or Aufhebung, . . . the structure is
plainly visible, the same structure that [de] Silentio calls a teleological suspensions in a case
where it is the ethical (society’s requirements) that is relativized vis-à-vis the religious (God’s
requirement)’ (546).
71. Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard’s Religiousness C: A Defense,’ 547, emphasis is mine.
72. Also, picking up a fallen book is not completely paradoxical, but I stand with Kaufmann in
believing that this is typical of the everyday usage of the term.
73. ‘There is something (formally) Hegelian in my account of Kierkegaard’s dialectic, but if by
‘temporizing’ is meant a softening that calls for a re-radicalization of Kierkegaard, as it clearly
does for Piper, I ask the court for a verdict of directed acquittal on the grounds that a plausible prima
facie case has not been made’ (Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard’s Religiousness C: A Defense’, 547–8).
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